Ivan Ilecic, SportynX

Ivan Ilečić, former Croatia national team analyst and football technology architect, breaks down Spain’s second-half pressure, Croatia’s physical decline and the tactical options available when a dominant opponent takes control.

Three days ago, after the heavy defeat to England, I wrote that what Croatia needed above all was a reaction and a reset, and that the real response had to come on the pitch.

I think we got that response against Spain.

Croatia lost 2-1, but for me, the result was not the most important aspect of this match. Far more important was the way Croatia played, particularly in the first half.

We saw completely different energy, aggression, intensity, concentration and approach. For large periods of the first half, Croatia controlled the game, played with courage, pressed high, won duels and showed the quality and character that this team undoubtedly possesses.

That also tells me that the atmosphere, mental preparation and overall preparation for this match were clearly at a completely different level compared to the England game.

We can regret the goals conceded and the chances we failed to convert, but against a team of Spain’s quality, you have to expect them to create a significant number of chances and dangerous situations. You can be fully focused, well organised and tactically disciplined, but you are facing players with such individual quality that they will inevitably decide certain situations in their favour.

20 MINUTES THAT CHANGED THE MATCH

However, there was one period of the match that I would particularly highlight.

From the start of the second half and for roughly the next 20 minutes, Spain effectively pinned us inside our own 30 metres. As expected, they increased the intensity of their press, we struggled to play out under pressure and could barely get out of our own half.

There is another important factor to consider when looking at why this happened.

Croatia had expended a huge amount of energy in the first half. We played at a high intensity, with aggression, duels and a lot of running. If you also have two or three players who are currently not at their maximum physical capacity and find it difficult to sustain that level of intensity for 90 minutes, a certain physical drop in the second half is not unexpected.

WHEN THE OPPOSITION CONTROLS POSSESSION, YOUR PHYSICAL LOAD KEEPS INCREASING

The problem becomes even greater when that physical drop coincides with a period in which Spain have more than 70 percent possession, keep you pinned deep in your own third, circulate the ball quickly, constantly switch the point of attack and force you to run almost continuously without the ball.

Their ball circulation is quick, while the wingers, midfielders and full-backs constantly attack the space behind the defensive line. At that point, the physical demands become enormous.

It is not only physical energy that you lose. Under constant pressure, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain concentration, press at the right moment and close spaces. Then, when you finally regain possession, you have less and less energy to provide quality passing options and retain the ball.

THE TACTICAL RESPONSE: WHAT DID CROATIA NEED?

This is exactly the kind of moment when you expect a tactical response.

If our biggest problem was that we could not play through Spain’s press, then in my opinion bringing on Beljo was not the solution.

To be clear, Beljo is a quality striker. He is a penalty-box player who can finish, provide an assist and make a difference when his team manages to progress the ball into the final third and the game is being played around the opposition penalty area.

But that was not our problem at that moment.

Our problem was how to get there in the first place.

Beljo is not the profile of player who will lead the high press on his own, drop deep into midfield, provide an additional option between the lines and help the team escape such intense pressure through short combinations and ball retention. By introducing Beljo, the coach was probably looking towards potential set pieces and crosses where his presence could be used, but those situations never really developed.

At that crucial stage, in my opinion, what we needed above all was another technically strong player in midfield.

Baturina seemed like a logical solution to me, and he did come on. Marco Pašalić, for example, did not. If Kramarić was physically ready to play the final 30 minutes, he is also a player whose technical quality allows him to combine in tight spaces, operate as an additional midfielder, help retain possession and create an overload centrally. However, we do not know his physical condition, so from the outside we can only speculate.

Marco Pašalić would also have brought technical quality and aggression in midfield, as well as pace if an opportunity to attack in transition appeared.

With those types of players, we could have tried to create a numerical overload in midfield, give the player in possession more passing options, play through the first line of Spain’s press more effectively and regain at least some control in central areas.

AT CERTAIN STAGES OF A MATCH, A TRADITIONAL NUMBER NINE CAN BECOME A BURDEN

This brings me to something that has barely been discussed after the match.

In a situation like this, there is nothing unusual about taking off the traditional striker and playing part or even the remainder of the match without a conventional number nine when you are facing this kind of pressure.

There can be a very clear tactical purpose behind such a decision. If the opposition is completely dominating you with their press and you cannot play out of your own third, an additional technically strong midfielder can be far more valuable at that moment than a striker waiting for a ball that his team cannot get to him anyway.

The formation on paper and the original game plan then become secondary.

What matters is not whether you have a traditional number nine on the pitch. What matters far more is reacting tactically to what is actually happening and finding a structure that can solve the problem the opposition is creating.

At that moment, our problem was control of the ball.

What we primarily needed was not to break through quick forwards on the counterattack. We needed more players capable of receiving under pressure, providing another passing option and helping move the entire team 20 or 30 metres further up the pitch.

That does not only give you greater tactical control of the match. It also reduces the physical burden on your own team.

Because one of the best ways to recover against a team that is forcing you to run constantly is to take the ball away from them for a period and keep possession yourself.

Once you regain control of possession, you are no longer trapped inside your own 30 metres. You can gradually progress into the middle third and then into the final third, where the same principles of control and combination play can be used to start breaking down their defensive structure.

WHEN THE TACTICAL PROBLEM DICTATES THE STRUCTURE OF THE TEAM

One of the best examples of why a traditional number nine is not always a tactical necessity came from Spain themselves.

At EURO 2012, Vicente del Bosque played several key matches without a traditional centre-forward, using Cesc Fàbregas as a false nine. In the final against Italy, he started with Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi, Iniesta, Silva and Fàbregas, effectively six technically outstanding midfield and attacking players, while Fernando Torres started on the bench.

Spain won that final 4-0. The criticism from the media and parts of the football world was initially enormous, at times almost dismissive, yet later Del Bosque was praised as a genius. That decision helped broaden tactical thinking for many coaches and opened up different ways of creating overloads and controlling matches, principles that are now an integral part of modern football.

Of course, I am not comparing this Croatia team with that Spain side, nor am I suggesting that Croatia should copy their system in future matches.

I am specifically talking about matches against teams such as Spain, France and England, where the same rules do not necessarily apply and where it was reasonable to expect a situation like this to occur at some stage during roughly 60 minutes of actual playing time, with the ball out of play for approximately 30 minutes.

My point is simply that you should not be restricted by positions or formations. When the opposition creates a problem, you have to find the players and the structure that give you the best chance of solving it.

THE CYCLE THAT NEEDED TO BE BROKEN

Against Spain, Croatia showed in the first half that we could compete with them on equal terms and even dominate certain periods of the match. At the same time, doing so required a significant physical effort.

At the beginning of the second half, Spain increased their intensity and pressing, our players began to tire physically and we lost control of the ball.

The less possession we had, the more we had to run. The more we ran without the ball, the more energy we spent. And the more energy we spent, the harder it became to regain control.

That was the cycle we needed to try to break.

Not by running more, but by adding technical quality, numbers and control in midfield.

That does not mean such a change would definitely have worked. Spain were on the other side and the opposition reacts to your decisions as well. But in my opinion, that was the moment when we needed to try to change the balance of the match.

Of course, analysing a match afterwards is always easier. I am not presenting this as the only correct solution, but rather as an analytical view of possible adjustments and alternative solutions worth considering in future matches.

THIS IS WHERE THE TACTICAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE COACHES REALLY BEGINS

From an analytical and tactical perspective, this was perhaps the most interesting period of the match for me.

Not because of whether Beljo, Budimir, Pašalić, Baturina, Kramarić or somebody else should have played.

But because of a much more important question:

When one of the most technically gifted national teams in the world takes control of the match away from you, what do you do to take it back?